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FOCUS SECTION
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OE CATHOLIC
EDUCATION LAW: HOW DID WE GET
WHERE WE ARE?
MARY ANGELA SHAUGHNESSY, SCN
Spalding University
Private school law is a relatively new phenomenon in legal research. This
article senses as a primer in case law for private schools, reviewing the most
significant decisions of the past 30 years and articulating several important
distinctions for Catholic educators. After examining the foundational cases,
the author concludes with a look at several hot topics that educators are fac-
ing in the courts.
Private school law, in particular as il applies to Catholic schools, is a legalteenager ready to come of age. This article will examine the last 30 years
or so of private education law applicable to Catholic education, especially
Catholic schools. The primary emphasis will be on those early cases which
provide the foundation for the interpretation of law today.
SELECT CASES
The law relating to public schools has been in an almost constant state of
development since 1960, but there were relatively few private school cases
prior to the 1980s. Private school cases increase each year, but there is a
marked judicial reluctance to interfere in cases that may involve religious
matters. Also, the United States Supreme Court has never heard a private
school case involving student dismissal. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn was a 1982
U.S. Supreme Court case that involved teacher dismissal and remains the
only such case in history. Since case law for private higher education devel-
oped more rapidly than did case law for private elementary and secondary
schools, the body of law affecting private higher education is slightly larger
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than that affecting private elementary and secondary education. Private high-
er education law helped to establish legal principles that guide elementary
and secondary school legal decisions today.
Prior to 1960 courts were reluctant to interfere in public school cases to
any great degree. Practicing the doctrine of judicial restraint, the courts
decided very few cases against the institution. The legal doctrine of in loco
parentis held that schools, colleges, and their administrators acted in the place
of parents. In theory, if a court determined that a reasonable parent could (not
would) make a decision similar to the one made by school officials, that court
would fmd in favor of the institution. Courts generally allowed school offi-
cials to discipline students and to dismiss them without even telling the stu-
dents the reasons for their actions (Anthony v. Syracuse University, 1928;
Ciiriy V. Lasell Seminary Co.. 1897; Gott v. Berea College, 1913; Stetson
University v. Hunt, 1924). The landmark public university case Dixon v.
Alabama (1960, 1961) broke judicial restraint and won procedural due
process for public college students. A student must be told what the charges
are (given notice) and must be allowed a hearing at which the student can
present his or her side of the story; and the hearing must be held before an
impartial tribunal, with school officials considered impartial.
By 1974, public secondary and elementary students had firmly estab-
lished their rights. The 1969 landmark case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District involved public elementary and secondary students who wore
black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. After refusing to obey the prin-
cipal's directive to remove the armbands because of a possible disruptive
effect, the students were suspended. The students sued, citing a violation of
their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech. The United States
Supreme Court agreed with the students and held, "It can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the [public] schoolhouse gate" (p. 506). The First and
Fourteenth Amendments' protections were thus extended to public school
students facing suspension and expulsion. For the first time, persons under
the age of 18 were considered persons under the Constitution. Previous deci-
sions, relying on principles of English common law, viewed children as prop-
erty.
In 1975 the United States Supreme Court heard the public school case of
Goss V. Lopez, which involved high school students suspended for a mini-
mum of two weeks without any kind of Constitutional due process. The
Supreme Court held that such action was not "a minimal disruption" of the
educational process and that students' Fifth Amendment substantive and pro-
cedural due process rights had to be protected. Tinker had already established
that public school students have Constitutional rights that cannot be arbitrar-
ily violated. Goss v, Lopez and its progeny established the tenets of
Constitutional due process rights in public schools.
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y^ood V. Strickland (1975), heard the same day as Goss, established the
fact that, although students do not have an absolute right to an education, they
cannot be deprived of an education without procedural due process. Wood v.
Strickland is perhaps best known because of its finding that school officials
could not claim immunity from prosecution for violation of student rights if
they knew or should have known the right procedures or if they acted out of
malice.
In 1980, noted legal scholar Kern Alexander offered a definition of sub-
stantive due process that remains a good statement of the law today:
"Substantive due process means that, 'If a state is going to deprive a person
of his life, liberty or property, the state must have a valid objective and the
means used must be reasonably calculated to achieve the objective'" (p. 343).
Substantive due process can also be defined as fundamental reasonableness
or fairness. Substantive due process involves moral as well as legal ramifica-
tions: Is this action fair and reasonable? Substantive due process applies
wherever property or liberty interests can be demonstrated.
Property interest (Black, 1990) has been defined as:
that which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclu-
sively to one.... The word is also commonly used to denote everything which
is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible,
real or personal...and includes every invasion of one's property rights by
actionable wrong, (p. 1216)
It is important to note that the object owned can be intangible, such as the
right to a public education or the right to tenure in a public institution. A lib-
erty interest is held in Constitutional rights and in certain rights conferred by
state laws. Liberty interest is sometimes defined so as to include the right to
reputation. But certain conditions must be met before a property interest such
as tenure can be advanced. A litigant must be able to prove that he or she has
a particular right before the court can uphold that right and before any admin-
istrator can be held responsible for protecting the right; he or she must
demonstrate that he or she would have been rehired, for example, if the
Constitutionally protected activity had not occurred (see these "free speech"
cases: Givhan v. Western Line, 1979; Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 1977; Pickering v.
B.O.E., 1968).
Teachers and other employees in the public sector may not be disciplined
without due process of law. School districts may decide not to renew the con-
tracts of non-tenured teachers without due process because non-tenured
teachers do not have "a legitimate claim of entitlement to" renewal of con-
tract.
No Constitutional protections existed in the past or exist now for those in
private educational institutions. The Constitution is concerned with what the
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government can and cannot do, not with what private entities can do. Because
the private school is not an extension of the state, students and teachers can-
not generally claim Constitutional protections. Although well established by
law, this reality is not commonly known. This author has spent 17 years on
the speaking circuit and generally uses a true or false pre-test, the first item
of which is usually, "Students and teachers in Catholic schools do not have
the same rights that students and teachers in public schools have." The vast
majority of teachers and parents classify the statement as false when it is true.
The fact that the rules are very different in the public and private sectors pro-
vides the foundation for case law.
Catholic educational administrators can prohibit behaviors that the pub-
lic school cannot prohibit. For example, a Catholic school or religious edu-
cation administrator can forbid the wearing of objectionable items or the
writing of materials that espouse beliefs, such as pro-choice or euthanasia
positions, because such positions are contrary to the teachings of the Catholic
Church. A public institutional administrator cannot prohibit such actions,
because the right to take such action is protected by the First Amendment of
the Constitution, and affirmed by the Tinker (1969) decision.
In early rulings the doctrine of separation of church and state protected
church-sponsored schools from being sued successfully. The last 20 years
have seen a rise in the number of cases brought by private school students and
teachers. The reticence that once seemed to preclude a church member suing
a church authority has largely disappeared. Since the majority of private
schools are church-related, it follows that the majority of private school cases
would come from church-related schools.
As previously stated, teachers and students in private schools do not pos-
sess the Constitutional protections that their public school counterparts do.
The primary law governing private schools is that of contract law. Since the
proper outcome of a contract case is damages and not reinstatement, persons
may be reluctant to go to the expense of bringing suit if they are dismissed
from a private school.
The rights of the private school to exist and of parents to send their chil-
dren to private schools were established by the 1925 landmark case of Pierce
V. Society of Sisters:
The fundamental theory of libeny upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obJigations. (p. 535)
Mary Angela Shaughnessy/HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CATHOLIC EDUCATION LAW 441
LAWS GOVERNING PRIVATE SCHOOLS
To understand what rights are protected in the private school and what rights
are not protected, it is necessary to understand the public school rights, root-
ed in the United States Constitution, as enumerated above. Generally, there
are four types of laws governing schools in the United States: 1)
Constitutional law, which applies almost exclusively to the public sector; 2)
state and administrative regulations; 3) common law; and 4) contract law. The
latter three govern both public and private education. Contract law is the
major source of the law affecting private institutions.
STATE ACTION: THE DECIDING FACTOR IN PRIVATE
EDUCATION CASES
Before a private institution can be required to grant constitutional protections
to teachers and students, the substantial presence of state action must be
demonstrated: The court must determine that the state is significantly
involved in a specific contested private action to such an extent that the action
can be said to be that of the state.
Generally, four theories are advanced to prove state action in a private
school. Faccenda and Ross in 1975 identified three: state funding, state con-
trol, and tax-exempt status of the private institution. The fourth theory is the
public function or benefit theory that holds that if an institution performs a
public function, such as education, the private institution can be held to the
same standards. The public function theory has been virtually abandoned in
legal decisions.
There are three cases involving private schools, two of which involve
Catholic schools, that provide much of the foundation for legal decisions
today. The first case was the 1970 Bright v. Isenbarger, in which dismissed
students alleged that state action was present because of state regulation of
the school and the school's tax-exempt status. The court rejected the claim:
"Accordingly, under the authority of the Powe, Browns, and Grossner deci-
sions, this court holds that because the State of Indiana was in no way
involved in the challenged actions, defendants' expulsion of plaintiffs was not
state action" (p. 1395).
The facts of Bright are as follow. Two students were dismissed for the'
remainder of the school year for a second violation of a rule forbidding vis-
its to a nearby public school. The students maintained that since the school
was certified by the state of Indiana, was governed by state school law, and
received state and federal grant monies, the state action requirement was met
and, therefore, constitutional rights were theirs. The court disagreed, holding
as stated above, that the state has to be somehow involved in the actual deci-
sion resulting in the expulsion. Since there was no evidence that the state had
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anything at all to do with the disciplinary actions of the school, state action
could not be found and no constitutional rights existed.
In a 1976 expulsion case, Wisch v. Sanford School. Inc., a student main-
tained that the federal funding present in the private school through various
governmental programs constituted state action. The court, however, dis-
agreed:
Plaintiff must show that there was more than "some" state action in this
case; not every involvement by the state in the affairs of a private individual
or organization, whether through funding or regulation, may be used as a
basis for a [Section] 1983 or Fourteenth Amendment claim. The involvement
must be "substantial." (p. 1313)
In a 1979 case, an expelled student and his father brought suit against a
Catholic high school in Geraci v. St. Xavier High School and alleged the pres-
ence of state action. Once again, the court found that even if state action were
present it would have to be so entwined with the contested activity, dismissal
of the student, that a symbiotic relationship could be held to exist between the
state and the school's dismissal of the student. If no such relationship can be
established, state action is not present and constitutional protections do not
apply:
Other than ascertaining that the school meets minimum state standards for a
high school, the state exercises no control over the school whatsoever. This
is certainly not the sort of pervasive state involvement required for a finding
of symbiotic state action, {p. 148)
The one case involving a private school teacher contesting dismissal was
heard by the United States Supreme Court in 1982 in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn.
This case is significant because, although the school received over 90% of its
funds from the state, the Supreme Court declined to find the presence of state
action significant enough to warrant Constitutional protections. Previous
lower court decisions had suggested the difficulty of proving significant state
action present in teacher dismissals in the private school {Lorentez v. Boston
College, 1977).
Rendell-Baker (1982) indicates that, unless the state can somehow be
shown to be involved in the contested activity affecting a teacher, the court
will not intervene in the action. Thus, it seems that the state action argument
is useless when a private school student or teacher attempts to claim
Constitutional protections in the private setting. Exceptions to the Rendell-
Baker decision might lie in the area of discrimination, particularly as the
Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery. The 1983 case Bob Jones
University v. United Stales illustrates. Bob Jones University lost its tax-
exempt status because it discriminated on the basis of race. Similarly, a
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Catholic school that dismissed an unmarried pregnant teacher but allowed
male teachers who were known to be engaged in sexual activity outside mar-
riage to remain on the faculty was found liable for sex discrimination (Dolter
V. Wahlert, 1980). The reader should note, however, that the remedy for such
injustices and for contract violations is not reinstatement, but is generally
damages.
BREACH OF CONTRACT
Teacher cases rising from the private schools usually involve breach of con-
tract, which can be defined as occurring "when a party does not perform that
which he or she was under an absolute duty to perform and the circumstances
are such that his or her failure was neither justified nor excused" (Gatti &
Gatti, 1983, p. 124).
A 1973 case, Weithoffv. St. Veronica's School, is an example of breach of
contract. A teacher was dismissed for marrying a priest who had not been lai-
cized and she incurred the penalty, which was Church practice at the time, of
excommunication from the Church. It is easy to understand why such an indi-
vidual might be considered unfit to teach in a Catholic school. However, the
teacher had signed a contract binding her to the "promulgated policies" of the
parish. The parish school board had enacted a policy requiring all teachers to
be practicing Catholics; the policy, however, was kept in the secretary's files
and never promulgated to the teacher. The court found for the teacher because
the school did not meet its obligation of promulgation. The plaintiff also
wanted the court to rule on whether she was indeed excommunicated from the
Catholic Church. Relying on the principle of judicial restraint, the court
declined to enter into internal disciplinary actions relating to Church beliefs
and practices.
The 1978 case oiSteeber v. Benilde-St. Margaret's High School involved
a Catholic schoolteacher whose contract was not renewed after her remar-
riage without an annulment. The court ruled in favor of the school because
the school did have a rule that had been properly promulgated.
Weithoff'{\91'i) and Steeber {\91'&) illustrate that the courts will look to
the provisions of contracts in breach of contract cases, basing decisions on
what the parties involved have agreed to do and not on what they should have
agreed to do or on any other factor.
Courts have upheld the right of private schools to make rules of conduct
for teachers and students that would not be permitted in public institutions.
However, the private school must have policies that prohibit certain types of
conduct before it can dismiss a teacher for misconduct (Weiihoff, 1973).
The 1982 case of Holy Name School of the Congregation of the Holy
Name of Jesus of Kimherly v. Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Relations
and Maty P. Retlick illustrates. Retlick's contract was not renewed because
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she married a divorced Catholic man who had not obtained an annulment of
his first marriage. The school sought to prove that she was not entitled to
unemployment benefits because she willfully violated her contract. Retlick,
however, was able to demonstrate that the only policy the school had regard-
Ing divorced and remarried teachers concerned religion teachers. Further, the
principal had encouraged the teacher to live with the man rather than marry
him if she could not marry within the Church, so the schoors defense that the
marriage was immoral could not withstand judicial scrutiny and Retlick
received unemployment.
Courts will consider the characteristics and behavior of the parties
involved in a contract. Just as the principal's behavior in Holy Name (1982)
discredited the allegation of immoral behavior in the teacher's action, in a dif-
ferent case a teacher's behavior led the court to find that the teacher should
have known that his conduct did not meet the norms of the sponsoring school.
In the 1982 case Bischoff v. Brothers of the Sacred Heart, a former Catholic
seminarian who had been twice divorced and remarried without the appro-
priate annulments was held to have been responsible for knowing what the
school required. Once the school learned of his marriages, the school rescind-
ed its contract, and Mr. Bischoff sued. The court ruled, "Plaintiff testified he
was aware of Catholic dogma regarding divorce and we conclude, as did the
Trial Jury, that the plaintiff's bad faith caused error and the contract was void
ab initio" (p. 151).
Historically courts have been reluctant to intervene in disputes involving
church-related schools and programs because of separation of church and
state. The 1982 case of Reardon v, LeMoyne drew much attention from the
public and the press because it involved four Roman Catholic sisters whose
contracts were not renewed after 5 to 12 years of employment. The sisters
sued the parish school board, the superintendent of schools, and the bishop.
The sisters alleged that their contracts had been violated. They had signed the
same employment contracts as had lay personnel, and statements in the con-
tract and in the school's handbook gave a dismissed teacher the right of a
hearing and an appeal. At the direction of the superintendent, the sisters were
not allowed a hearing. The trial court declined to intervene, holding that such
intervention would be a violation of separation of church and state. On
appeal, the state supreme court ruled that a court could intervene in non-doc-
trinal contract disputes and ruled in favor of the sisters who were not rein-
stated; an out-of-court settlement was negotiated.
The crux of the Reardon (1982) problem seemed to be the language of
the employment contract. The language was, at best ambiguous: the contract
indicated that it would terminate at the end of the contractual year; another
clause, clearly contradicting the first clause, stated that retirement of the
employee was to occur at the end of the school year during which the
employee attained his or her 70th birthday. The policies also stated that if a
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contract was not to be renewed, the employee was to be notified in writing
and given well-documented reasons for the non-renewal. The contract con-
tained a further provision allowing appeal to the diocesan school board. The
sisters then went to court asking the court to construe their employment con-
tracts:
In the petition, they [the sisters) first sought a declaration that the defen-
dants' decision to end their respective employment relationships constituted
a "dismissal" which entitled them to the procedural safeguards outlined in
their contracts. Second, they asked the court to find that the defendants had
violated their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the
law. Third, they sought a ruling based on substantial evidence, and that the
cause in this case was not sufficient. Finally, in the event that the trial court
found that defendants' action constituted "non-renewal" of the contracts, the
plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the reasons given by the diocesan
superintendent, in his January letter to the plaintiffs, were "not sufficient."
(Reardon, 1982, p. 431)
The trial court found that the court could only exercise jurisdiction over the
lay members of the school board and not over the superintendent and the
bishop because of separation of church and state. The trial court also stated
that the plaintiffs would not prevail against the school board.
On appeal, the state supreme court found that the doctrine of separation
of church and state did not preclude jurisdiction in non doctrinal contract
matters:
Religious entities, however, are not totally immune from responsibility
under civil law. In religious controversies involving property or contractual
rights outside the doctrinal realm, a court may accept jurisdiction and render
a decision without violating the first amendment.... It is clear from the fore-
going discussion that civil courts are permitted to consider the validity of
non-doctrinal claims which are raised by parties to contracts with religious
entities. This requires the courts to evaluate the pertinent contractual provi-
sions and extrinsic evidence to determine whether any violations of the con-
tract have occurred, and to order appropriate remedies, if necessary.
(Reardon. 1982, pp. 431-432)
In essence, the state supreme court found that the trial court should have
accepted jurisdiction over the bishop and the superintendent as well as over
the school board members. Further, the state supreme court held that the trial
court should have ruled on the requests made by the sisters and should have
analyzed their legal rights.
Reardon (1982) illustrates the extreme importance of contract language.
One cannot allow anyone, including members of a religious congregation, to
sign an employment contract and then not expect to be held to the provisions
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of that contract. The school board should have granted the sisters a hearing
because that is what the contract said the board would do when it was
requested to do so.
The above cases involving church schools illustrate that adniinistrators
cannot hide behind the First Amendment as a cover for any actions they wish
to take. The courts have made it clear that they have jurisdiction over the non-
doctrina! elements of a contract made with a religious entity.
The Holy Name (1982) case illustrates that, while courts will not rule on
the rightness or wrongness of a given religious doctrine, they will look to see
whether the action based on the doctrine is reasonable and consistent. The
Weithoff (1913) case illustrates the need for clear policies that are dissemi-
nated to all. The Dolter(\9S0) case established the right of the courts to inter-
vene in sex discrimination cases. The Bob Jones (1983) case demonstrates
that, since Congress has made racial discrimination a matter of public pohcy,
courts will intervene in racial discrimination suits. These cases helped to
establish the fact that persons in the private sector do have rights that will be
protected by the courts. Administrators are required to know what those
rights are and to provide protection. Legally sound written policies and
guidelines greatly facilitate both the knowledge and protection of rights.
TORTS
Torts represent one of the most common types of legal action brought under
statutory and regulatory law. A tort, according to Black (1990), is "a private
or civil wrong or injury...for which the court u'ill provide a remedy in the
form of an action for damages" (p. 1489). Historically, torts are generally
classified in education law in four categories: corporal punishment, search
and seizure, defamation, and negligence. The law governing torts is virtually
the same in both the public and private sectors.
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
Corporal punishment is less of an issue today than it was in 1977 when in
Ingraham v. Wright the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that students in public
schools do not have the protection of the Eighth Amendment when subjected
to corporal punishment, even if the punishment can be considered "cruel and
unusual." In 1984 very few states outlawed corporal punishment; today the
majority of states forbid its use. New areas of concern have surfaced in the
last 30 years. Corporal punishment has been enlarged to include any bodily
touching that can be construed as punitive. A related issue is that of mental
or emotional abuse. Claims of mental abuse do not seem to have received
serious consideration in the '70s and '80s; today, it is not uncommon for
teachers to be accused of mental abuse.
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Search and seizure problems occur when a student alleges injury from a
search of person or property. Early cases delineated differences between
probable and reasonable cause. Probable cause is a stricter standard than rea-
sonable cause and will be held to exist when a school official has reliable
knowledge about the whereabouts of dangerous or potentially dangerous
material on campus. Reasonable cause is a suspicion with some basis in fact.
A phone call, a note, or a suspicious appearance can comprise reasonable
cause.
Historically, case law indicated that once a public school administrator
involves the police in a search or turns seized items over to the police, Fourth
Amendment protections do apply and improperly seized evidence can be
excluded from a trial if criminal convictions are later sought (People v. Scott
D., 1974). In the 1984 case Massachusetts Petitioner v. Osborne Sheppard,
the Supreme Court held that improperly seized evidence must not always be
excluded from criminal proceedings. Thus, an improper search could be a
violation of a student's constitutional rights and administrators can be held
liable for damages as perpetrators of Constitutional torts. The rationale for
holding public school administrators to a less strict standard than are other
public officials in search and seizure situations is primarily based on the in
loco parentis doctrine in which school officials have the right to act as a rea-
sonable parent would if he or she suspected a child to be in possession of
some Illegal or dangerous substance.
In 1985 the United States Supreme Court heard the search and seizure
case of New Jersey u T.L. O. The Supreme Court ruled that public school offi-
cials should be held to a reasonable, rather than probable cause, standard.
Thus, public school officials are not under the same strictures as are police
officers. Since Constitutional protections do not exist in private schools,
administrators are not even held to a "reasonable suspicion" standard.
Nonetheless, they should have some kind of policy for searching students and
seizing their possessions. Searching a student should require more cause than
searching a locker.
Private school educators could be subject to private tort suits if a student
claims to have been harmed by a search. Like public school officials, private
educators could be charged with the torts of assault and battery and invasion
of privacy. The search's level of intrusion determines the court's degree of
scrutiny. Asking a student to empty his pockets would require a less strict
degree of scrutiny than would a body search.
DEFAMATION
Defamation is the violation of a person's liberty interest or right to reputation.
It is the utterance of words in spoken or written form that are detrimental to
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the subject's reputation. Defamation can encompass a wide range of remarks;
almost anything negative said about someone could be construed as defama-
tory since it could affect a person's reputation or the esteem in which others
hold the person.
The potential for defamation to be alleged certainly exists in administra-
s' relationshi ith t d t d t h A d i i t t h l d b f
ers or students. The news media report defamation cases in which the defen
dant asserts an affirmative defense of truth. School officials are often held to
a higher standard than is the average person because the school official holds
a position of trust and damage to reputation, rather than truth of the allega-
tion, determines the outcome.
NEGLIGENCE
Negligence, the most common tort, is "the unintentional doing or not doing
of something which wrongfully causes injury to another" (Gatti & Gatti,
1983, p. 246). Case law indicates that teachers and administrators are expect-
ed to act as reasonable persons; when their action or lack of action results in
injury to a student, a fmding of negligence can be made. Four elements must
be present before negligence can exist. These elements detlned by many legal
writers are duty, violation of duty, proximate cause, and injury. If any one of
the four elements is missing, no legal negligence and hence no tort can be
found to exist. Since negligence is the unintentional act which results in an
injury, a person charged with negligence is generally not going to face crim-
inal charges or spend time in prison.
An understanding of each of the four elements necessary to constitute a
fmding of negligence is essential for today's educator. Previous defenses such
as charitable immunity (e.g., an institution doing a charitable work is immune
from liability for negligence) are no longer available. Fvery Catholic educa-
tor should know that the days of people being unwilling to sue the Church
and its programs are over; litigants and lawyers often view the Church as a
wealthy, desirable defendant able to pay large sums in damages.
The first element is duty. The person charged with negligence must have
had a duty in the situation. Students have a right to safety and teachers and
administrators have a responsibility to protect the safety of all those entrust-
ed to their care. Teachers have a duty to provide reasonable supervision of
their students. Administrators must have developed rules and regulations that
provide for safety. Teachers will generally not be held responsible for injuries
occurring at a place where or at a time when they had no responsibility. A stu-
dent injured on the way to school, for example, will not be able to prove that
school officials had a duty to protect him or her.
Administrators must be aware that simply stating that the school does not
accept a given responsibility does not necessarily mean that the school has no
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responsibility. The situation of students arriving well before the opening of
school and staying after school when no supervision is present is one exam-
ple. Even today many principals believe that writing a rule that states, "There
is no supervision before 7:30 a.m. or after 3:00 p.m." absolves them from lia-
bility for any injuries students may sustain while on school property before
or after school. However, over 30 years of case law indicate that administra-
tors can be held liable for such injuries, even if there is a stated policy that no
supervision will be provided.
In the 1967 case Titus v. Lindberg, an administrator was found to be liable
for a student injury occurring on school grounds before school because he
knew that students arrived on the grounds before the doors were opened, he
was present on campus when students were, he had established no rules for
student conduct outside the building, nor had he provided for supervision of
the students. Although the principal had notified parents that no supervision
would be provided, the court found that he had a reasonable duty to provide
such supervision when he knew students were on the property as a regular
practice. Understandably, concerned principals may ask, "Am I expected to
provide 24-hour supervision?" The answer is "no," the court will look at the
reasonable nature of the administrator's behavior. Probably no court would
expect a supervisor to be present on school premises at 6:00 a.m.; however,
the court will expect some policy as to when students may arrive, what the
rules are, what kind of supervision will be provided and when it is provided,
and what the penalties for non-compliance are. Many other cases followed
the reasoning in Titus (1967). Current law seems to be shifting much respon-
sibility for student behavior from the parent to the school staff.
The second element that must be present for a finding of negligence is
violation of duty. Negligence cannot exist if there has been no violation of
duty. Courts expect that accidents and spontaneous actions can occnr. If a
teacher is properly supervising a playground and one child picks up a rock,
throws it, and so injures another child, the teacher should not be held liable.
However, if a teacher who is supervising recess were to allow rock-throwing
to continue without attempting to stop it and a student is injured, the teacher
would probably be held liable.
Courts have stopped short of requiring that teachers be physically present
at all times. Courts understand that emergencies can happen that necessitate
the teacher's leaving a class unattended for a short period of time. But, the
court will always apply "the reasonable person" test—did the teacher act in a
way that a reasonable teacher would act?
The third requirement of negligence is that the violation of duty must be
the proximate cause of the injury. In other words, would the injury have
occurred if proper supervision had been present? The court must decide
whether proper supervision conld have prevented the injury. The tragic case
of Levandoski v. Jackson City School District (1976) illustrates. A teacher
failed to report that a 13-year-old girl was missing from class; thus, the
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administrators had no knowledge that the student was absent, and parents
were not notified. The child's body was later found some distance from the
school. The child's mother filed suit against the school district and alleged
that, if the child's absence had been reported, the murder would not have hap-
pened. The court found that no evidence existed to show that if the absence
had been properly reported, the murder could have been prevented. It should
be easy to see how a slightly different fact pattern, such as one in which the
student was found murdered on the school grounds, would have produced a
finding of liability against the school. The Levandoski (1976) court simply
found that, in this particular case, the violation of duty was not the proximate
cause of the injury.
The case of Smith v. Archbishop of St. Louis (1982), involving a Catholic
school, illustrates the concept of proximate cause. A second-grade teacher
kept a lighted candle on her desk every morning during the month of May to
honor the Mother of God. She gave no special instructions to the students
regarding the danger of a lighted candle. A student, dressed in an untreated
crepe paper costume, walked too close to the fire and the costume caught fire.
The child sustained facial and upper body burns such that during the five
years the litigalion was in process, she was subjected to several operations
and painful treatments. She sustained psychological as well as physical
injuries and competent physicians testified that she would likely experience
psychological problems for the rest of her life. The Archdiocese of St. Louis
appealed the holding. The appellate court upheld the award and the finding of
negligent supervision against the Archdiocese. The court also discussed the
concept of fore see ability, which generally holds that a person can be found
negligent only if injury were foreseeable: "To recover, plaintiff need not show
that the very injury resulting from defendant's negligence was foreseeable,
but merely that a reasonable person could have foreseen that injuries of the
type suffered would be likely to occur under the circumstances" (Smith, 1982,
p. 521). The plaintiff did not have to prove that the defendant could foresee
that a particular injury, such as crepe paper catching fire, might occur; the
plaintiff merely had to establish that a reasonable teacher would have fore-
seen that injuries could result from an unattended lighted candle in a second-
grade classroom when no safety instructions were given.
The fourth element of negligence is injury. No matter how irresponsible
the behavior of a supervisor, there is no negligence if there is no injury. If a
teacher were to leave 20 first-graders unsupervised near a lake yet no one was
injured, there can be no finding of negligence.
Most negligence cases occur in the classroom because that is where stu-
dents and teachers spend most of their time. However, shop and lab classes
and athletic activities carry more potential for injury. Case law indicates that
courts expect supervisors to exercise greater caution in these areas than they
would in ordinary classrooms.
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HOW DOES LEGAL HISTORY AEEECT CURRENT
CASE DEVELOPMENTS?
An understanding of the historical basis for private school legal decisions is
essential for administrators of private schools and educational programs.
Today's important issues, while different in some ways than those of past
decades, are much the same in others. A brief discussion of the most current
hot topics in education law will illustrate.
CONFIDENTIALITY
A growing number of cases allege that a teacher's failure to report a student's
suicidal threats or ideation before the student successfully took his or her life
is negligence. Journal writing is one potentially problematic example. In the
1995 case of Brooks v. Logan and Joint District No. 2. a public school stu-
dent wrote in his journal, "I went into a medium depression and wrote poems
to two special people.... I told them it was too bad that I had to say good-bye
this way like that, but it would be the only way and I felt better" (p. 81).
The teacher did not report the student's writings to his parents or to
school officials. Subsequently, the student took his life. When the student's
writing surfaced after his death, his parents brought suit against the teacher.
The court ruled that the teacher could be required to face trial for involuntary
manslaughter. While the legal arguments underpinning this finding can be
found in tort law, much of tbe reasoning also seems to rely on common sense.
Which is more important—the student's right to have confidences respected
or the student's right to live? Education officials should require that all teach-
ers tell their students, "I will keep your confidence so long as no one's life,
health, or safety is at stake. Once life, health, or safety is at stake, I cannot
honor confidentiality."
There are only two confidentiality privileges left in this country: priest
and penitent, which is absolute, and attorney-client, which is not. Even an
attorney is required to act if a client threatens harm to self or others. So there
is no privilege that protects keeping confidences that if revealed might have
prevented serious harm.
VIOLENCE AND GANGS
The rise in school violence has alarmed educators. Sarah Watson in her arti-
cle "My Brother's Keeper: Violence and School Liability" in this issue ably
discusses the legal ramifications of this topic.
BOUNDARY ISSUES
While the overwhelming majority of cases involving boundary issues have
not reached courts of record, teachers have lost both their reputations and
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employment potential. Other teachers have found themselves subject to
restraining orders. Teachers must remember that they are professionals ren-
dering a service in much the same manner as physicians and attorneys.
Strong emotional involvement with students should be avoided. Teachers
must be aware that they need to avoid even the appearance of impropriety in
student-teacher relationships. If a student alleges improper behavior by a
teacher, the teacher will face many problems even if the allegation is eventu-
ally proven untrue.
CONCLUSION
The third millennium holds new legal challenges for Catholic educators. Law
is not ministry, but it is a boundary around ministry. As the law is a dynam-
ic, growing, reality, educational leaders need to be diligent in pursuing ongo-
ing information, inservice, and staff development opportunities for teachers
and administrators. As private education law grows into adolescence, it is
vital that the knowledge of private school leaders grows along with it.
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